Operational risk
The risks that come from Tuo's own operation, the keeper, the engine, the backend and the people running them.
Tuo's contracts are strategy-agnostic. Every decision about your position is taken off-chain by the Tuo engine and executed by a Tuo-run keeper. That makes Tuo's operations part of the risk.
A compromised or faulty keeper
The keeper is an address with a signing key in a cloud HSM, driven by Tuo's backend. If that key, that backend, or the engine feeding it were compromised or simply wrong, the vault bounds the damage inside the vault:
| Bound | Value |
|---|---|
| Where funds can go | The vault, the Uniswap position manager, the position's bound Hyperliquid operator, or back to the NFT owner. Nowhere else |
| Actions per position | A bucket of 10, refilling one action every 2.4 hours |
| Measured value loss per position | A bucket of 1.5% of basis, refilling over 24 hours, measured inside the vault. A swap is charged the larger of its loss at the TWAP and at spot |
| Swaps | Only through allowlisted aggregators, only between USDC and an allowlisted pool token, with a TWAP-derived floor |
Be precise about what that buys. The loss budget is a rate limiter, not a solvency guarantee. Neither budget is a cap on every sliding 24 hours: both are buckets that refill continuously, so a closed 24-hour span admits the full bucket plus a window of refill - 20 actions, or 3% of basis - before settling to 10 actions and 1.5% per day. It is per position, so it aggregates to 1.5% of total deposits per day. The ceiling is a share of recorded basis, and measured loss does not reduce that basis, so a sustained drain is linear: thirty daily refills are 45% of the original basis, plus up to another 1.5% if the bucket was already full when the period began. It does not meter losses on Hyperliquid at all: a hostile keeper can bridge margin to the position's operator and lose it on the venue without touching the budget, up to the product's hedge cap. The 1.5% is measured against total basis and does not shrink when margin is bridged, so for Basis Plus Core at its cap it is 3% of what remains in the vault. For Delta Hedge Standalone at its cap the swap floor and the action budget bind first, at about 9.6% of what remains at the launch swap tolerance; see Parameters. The real bound is detection followed by the treasury Safe revoking the keeper role. There is no break-glass unwind and no role that can reach a deployed range. Detection latency is the binding constraint on loss.
Tuo monitors the on-chain loss counter, changes to the operator allowlist and bridge discrepancies as mandatory alerts, and the keeper role is rotatable by the 2-of-3 Safe in one transaction.
The operator keys are part of the custody perimeter
Each position's hedge margin is at an address whose key is in Tuo's HSM. Losing that key strands whatever margin is on Hyperliquid at that moment. An operator key that has held margin is never deleted, and a position's binding to its operator is permanent, so operator keys cannot be rotated under a live position. The cloud account holding those keys is therefore part of what a customer trusts. See Counterparty and venue risk.
One backend, one engine
Tuo runs one backend service and one engine service. If either is down:
- no new keeper actions are taken and positions hold their current shape, hedged or not,
- the dashboard NAV stops updating (it is computed every five minutes by the backend),
- withdrawals that need the hedge closed wait until the keeper is back,
- your emergency exit does not depend on either. It is an on-chain call from your wallet, immediate when no Hyperliquid lifecycle is open and 24 hours after a withdrawal request otherwise, recovering everything on-chain in kind.
The engine going down is designed to mean "hold", not "act on stale data". A signal the engine could not fully determine is quarantined and never executed automatically.
The engine is frozen and proprietary
The strategy is a fixed, versioned engine that Tuo does not modify. Its behaviour is pinned by checksums and regression tests. That protects against silent strategy drift, and it means the strategy cannot adapt to a market regime it was not backtested on without a deliberate new version.
Data lag and withheld figures
The backend reads the chain at finality, which on Arbitrum trails the head by ten to twenty minutes, so recent events show up with that delay. A new position is the exception: it is listed as Confirming as soon as the deposit transaction confirms, with only the USDC credited and the idle balance, until it is recorded. The dashboard valuation deliberately publishes nothing rather than a partial figure when a leg cannot be priced, so you may see a gap in the chart rather than a wrong number.
Key-person and team risk
Tuo is a small team. Treasury actions need two of three hardware-wallet signers. Loss of the team, or of two signers, would leave the vault running with no one to rotate the keeper or sweep fees, but would not lock your funds: withdrawals and emergency exits need no Tuo signature.
The one on-chain circuit breaker is a pause on deposits only, held by a separate fast-acting pauser key. It never affects withdrawals or emergency exits.