Smart contract and oracle risk
The risks in the vault's code and in how it prices positions, including what has and has not been reviewed.
Immutable contracts
The Tuo contracts are not upgradeable. There are no proxies and no admin function that can change
the fee or the custody rules. This removes the risk of a malicious or mistaken upgrade, and it
means a bug cannot be patched in place. Pricing has one admin setting: the treasury Safe sets the
keeper's swap tolerance below the TWAP quote with setKeeperSwapSlippageBps, from 0 to 250 bps,
with no timelock.
Three allowlists are fixed when the vault is deployed and have no setter: the Uniswap pools, the valuation pools, and the deposit tokens. If any of them is wrong, or a pool needs to be added or removed, the whole system is redeployed and every position migrates. A bug in the contracts would be handled the same way: pause deposits, ask owners to withdraw, redeploy.
External review
The contracts have passed an internal audit-readiness review (no critical or high findings, static analysis clean), and the suite now runs 426 tests including a hostile-keeper invariant suite. Cyfrin reviewed the contracts in September 2026. The fixes for the findings Tuo accepted are in the code, and the report will be published when final. The external review is a launch gate: mainnet deployment is blocked until every critical and high finding is closed. Until the report is public, its findings cannot be checked from outside Tuo. See Audits.
Pricing from pool TWAPs only
The vault uses no external price oracle. Its only price source is each allowlisted pool's own 30-minute time-weighted average tick, read from the Uniswap pool. Settlement NAV, the exit swap floor and the keeper's slippage floors all come from that figure.
What protects it:
- a 30-minute window, so a manipulation must be sustained rather than a single block,
- a minimum of 2,000 oracle observation slots per pool, checked at deployment,
- a 200-tick (about 2%) gate between spot and TWAP on every keeper price path, so keeper actions revert while the pool is displaced,
- deep pools: WETH/USDC and WBTC/USDC at the 0.05% tier on Arbitrum.
What does not protect it:
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Nothing on-chain bounds the depth of those pools. The cost of moving a 30-minute mean tick scales with pool liquidity, and the payoff scales with vault exposure, which has no global cap. Tuo has asked its reviewers to price this attack explicitly.
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The emergency exit is deliberately ungated.
emergencyWithdrawunwinds ranges with a zero value floor and no TWAP check, so that the exit works under any market condition. It is exposed to MEV and to a displaced pool by construction; the protected path isrequestWithdrawthenwithdraw, whose unwind runs through gated, floored keeper actions. -
Its fee is measured on a different clock than its payout. The fee base is the 30-minute average, while you are paid the tokens themselves at whatever the market pays for them. The two disagree while the price is moving: after a fast fall the average still carries the old price, so the amount withheld is more than 30% of what you actually realize; after a rise it is less, and an average that has not moved at all charges nothing on an exit that is profitable at the market price. The gap is bounded by how far a 30-minute average can lag spot. The protected path shares the measurement: the settlement value is also read at the bare 30-minute average, so a partial withdrawal from a position still holding pool tokens or ranges measures its gross and its fee there too. A full withdrawal settles on idle USDC only, so the gap does not arise there.
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A sequencer halt turns off the deviation gate. If a pool goes 30 minutes without a new oracle observation, for example while the Arbitrum sequencer is stopped, the pool computes its 30-minute average from that one old observation and the current price. The average then equals spot, so the 200-tick gate passes at any price, including a stale one. For a keeper range mint or an idle swap, the vault then accepts the stale price, and any loss from it is not charged against the keeper's value-loss budget. The contracts do not check for this. Tuo's keeper software does:
- It does not mint or swap until the Arbitrum sequencer uptime feed has reported the sequencer up for more than an hour.
- It also needs the pool to have a new observation from the last 30 minutes.
The check lives off-chain, so it does not bind a compromised keeper key. That case is bounded by detection and by the 2-of-3 Safe that can revoke the keeper role. Even the honest keeper can still act on a stale price: a trade or a new range can record a fresh observation at the old price, and the grace hour gives arbitrage time to correct it but does not prove it has. Range burns and the emergency exit are not gated by any price check, so they stay available throughout.
The keeper's attestation
The vault takes one thing from the keeper on faith: the flag that says a hedge's margin return is final. That flag can only clear the vault's record of outstanding margin to zero, only while a withdrawal request is armed, and cannot move funds. A hostile keeper could use it to write off margin the vault then stops tracking, leaving that margin at the operator address with no on-chain claim. This is a disclosed residual risk, bounded by the hedge cap and the operator binding.
Read-only and classic reentrancy
Every state-changing path is guarded, and the valuation and keeper-budget views carry a read-only reentrancy guard so an aggregator callback cannot read a mid-swap NAV, nor a keeper budget that counts the swap in flight but not yet what it cost. This is standard, and it has been tested, but it is the class of bug audits most often find in vaults that hold LP positions.
Dependencies
The vault relies on Uniswap V3's position manager, OpenZeppelin 5.x, the 0x and 1inch routers, and
Circle's CCTP contracts. A vulnerability in any of them is a vulnerability in Tuo. The position
manager and OpenZeppelin cannot be swapped out without a redeploy. The aggregators can: the
treasury adds or retires one at runtime (addAggregator, removeAggregator), and 0x and 1inch are
only the launch set.
Deposit caps are per position (25,000 USDC at launch, which the treasury can change with
setPerNftCap) with no global cap and no depositor allowlist. A wallet can open any number of
positions. The only on-chain brakes on total exposure are the pauser stopping new deposits and the
treasury closing a product to new positions (setProductOpen(code, false)). Both are reactive,
not preventive.
See Architecture for the contract layout and invariants, and Roles and admin controls for what each role can do.