Parameters
Every protocol parameter in the Tuo contracts, what it means in plain language, and whether it can ever change.
All protocol parameters live in one library, TuoConstants, and are compiled into the contracts.
They cannot be changed after deployment. A handful of settings are stored on the vault and can be
adjusted by the treasury Safe; those are listed separately at the bottom.
Compiled constants
Fees and deposits
| Constant | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
PERFORMANCE_FEE_BPS | 3,000 (30%) | Share of the withdrawn portion of profit taken as a fee. Never charged on principal. No setter |
MIN_DEPOSIT_USDC | 2,500 USDC | Minimum USDC credited per deposit or top-up |
BPS_DENOMINATOR | 10,000 | Basis-point denominator shared by every ratio |
Keeper budgets
| Constant | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
MAX_KEEPER_ACTIONS_PER_WINDOW | 10 | Bucket capacity: metered keeper actions (swapIdle, mintLp, burnLp, bridgeToHl) a position holds at once |
KEEPER_ACTION_WINDOW | 24 hours | Time to refill the whole action bucket, so one action every 2.4 hours |
MAX_KEEPER_LOSS_BPS_PER_WINDOW | 150 bps | Bucket capacity: measured value loss the keeper may hold against one position at once, as a share of that position's total basis, margin on Hyperliquid included. A swap is measured at the pool's mean tick and at its gated spot tick, and charged the larger loss. A mint is charged the gap between what it consumed and the liquidity it produced, both valued at the mean tick |
KEEPER_LOSS_WINDOW | 24 hours | Time to clear whatever charge the loss bucket holds |
The action allowance regenerates continuously, but it is spent a whole slot at a time. The views
round the charged count up to match, so MAX_KEEPER_ACTIONS_PER_WINDOW minus the reported count is
the number of metered calls a position still admits.
How to read the two budgets
Both are leaky buckets: a capacity plus a refill rate. Neither is a maximum over every sliding 24-hour interval. Capacity is free again 2.4 hours after the call that spent it, not 24 hours after, so a keeper starting on a full bucket can spend the whole capacity at once and then keep topping it back up as it refills.
| Action budget | Measured-loss budget | |
|---|---|---|
| Capacity | 10 metered actions | 150 bps of the position's basis |
| Refill | one action every 2.4 hours | proportional to the charge held: one window clears whatever is there, which is 15 bps every 2.4 hours while the bucket sits at its ceiling |
| Opening burst | 10 actions | 150 bps |
| Most possible inside one closed 24-hour span | 20 actions | 300 bps |
| Sustained after that | 10 actions per day | 150 bps per day |
The loss budget is a rate limiter, not a solvency guarantee. Its ceiling is a share of the position's recorded basis, and measured loss does not reduce that basis, so a sustained drain is linear rather than compounding: thirty daily refills are 45% of the original basis, plus up to another 1.5% if the bucket was already full when the period began. What a keeper can actually reach is bounded further by the swap floor, the deviation gate and the action budget. The real bound on a compromised keeper is detection plus the treasury Safe revoking the keeper role.
Pricing and slippage
| Constant | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
TWAP_WINDOW | 30 minutes | Window for every pool TWAP the vault reads, for valuation and for gates |
MIN_OBSERVATION_CARDINALITY | 2,000 | Oracle observation slots a pool must have provisioned before the vault will price against it. Checked at deployment; the deployment aborts otherwise |
MAX_TWAP_DEVIATION_TICKS | 200 (about 2%) | Largest allowed distance between spot and TWAP before keeper pool operations, and the owner's exit swap into a non-USDC token, revert |
EXIT_FLOOR_BPS | 50 bps | Floor under the owner's token-elected exit swap: the mean-tick quote less this, on top of the owner's own minimum. Compiled in because it protects an owner whose frontend passes a zero minimum |
MAX_KEEPER_SWAP_SLIPPAGE_BPS | 250 bps | Ceiling on the treasury-set keeper swap tolerance below. Wide enough to keep a spot-priced fill reachable across the whole deviation band plus a route's own cost |
LP_BURN_VALUE_FLOOR_BPS | 9,950 (99.5%) | Minimum share of a position's TWAP value a burn must return, measured on both legs combined. A check on the position manager's execution: price movement cannot trip it |
LP_BURN_FLOOR_MIN_VALUE_USDC | 1 USDC | Burn floor under which the check above is skipped. Per-leg rounding leaves a residue of a few raw units that outweighs 0.5% only on dust, about 0.15 USDC for WBTC at 73,000 USD |
MIN_LP_TICK_WIDTH | 200 ticks (about 2%) | Narrowest range the keeper may mint |
Hedge and exit
| Constant | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
MIN_HL_BRIDGE_USDC | 10 USDC | Smallest margin transfer to a Hyperliquid operator. An operational floor set by the bridge itself: under 5 USDC a transfer is not credited at all, and 10 USD is Hyperliquid's own minimum order size |
EMERGENCY_WITHDRAW_DELAY | 24 hours | Wait after requestWithdraw before emergencyWithdraw unlocks |
MAX_LP_COUNT | 3 | The most open liquidity positions any product may allow. emergencyWithdraw closes every one of them in a single transaction, so the ceiling is what keeps that exit inside one block |
USD accounting is USDC with 6 decimals throughout. The vault prices against pool TWAPs only, so no external oracle decimal convention applies.
Product policies
Products are registered in the vault at deployment. The registry is add-only: a code can never be overwritten, and retiring a product only blocks new positions.
| Product | Code | Hedge cap (maxHedgeBps) | Max open LPs (maxLpCount) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basis Plus Core | 1 | 5,000 bps (50% of basis) | 3 |
| Delta Hedge Standalone | 2 | 9,000 bps (90% of basis) | 1 |
The hedge cap bounds how much of a position's basis may sit on Hyperliquid at once. It is the only on-chain bound on the leg the vault cannot measure.
How the loss ceiling and the hedge cap interact
The loss ceiling is 150 bps of total basis, and it does not shrink when margin is bridged. The
actions it charges, swapIdle and mintLp, can only reach what is still in the vault, so relative
to that on-chain allocation the ceiling is 1.5% / (1 - hedged share). A second bound comes from
the swap floor: ten swaps of the whole allocation, each filled at the keeper swap tolerance under
the TWAP, lose at most 1 - (1 - tolerance)^10 of it before the action budget is spent. At the
launch tolerance of 100 bps that is 1 - 0.99^10 = 9.56%. Whichever of the two is lower is the
control that binds.
| Product | Hedge cap | Ceiling, as a share of the on-chain allocation | Floor and action bound at 100 bps | Binds first |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Basis Plus Core | 50% | 3% (375 USDC of the 12,500 left from a 25,000 USDC basis) | 9.56% | The ceiling |
| Delta Hedge Standalone | 90% | 15% (375 USDC of the 2,500 left) | 9.56% (about 239 USDC) | The floor and action budget |
The two bounds cross at a hedge of 84.3% of basis. The floor bound moves with the swap tolerance:
4.9% at 50 bps, 9.56% at 100, and at about 161 bps it reaches 15%, above which the basis-sized
ceiling is the binding control for a position hedged at 90%. The tolerance is a treasury setting
capped at MAX_KEEPER_SWAP_SLIPPAGE_BPS, so this ordering can change after deployment; the loss
ceiling itself never does. The charge is the larger of the mean-tick and spot-tick measurements,
and a mint is charged too, so in practice the ceiling can bind earlier than the table says, never
later.
The LP cap is a per-product choice, but only up to MAX_LP_COUNT above. That ceiling is compiled
in, not a treasury setting, so no product can ever be registered with more open positions than the
emergency exit can unwind in one transaction. Basis Plus Core sits exactly at it.
Treasury-settable values
These live in vault storage and can be changed by the treasury Safe. Every change emits an event.
| Setting | Launch value | Setter | Event |
|---|---|---|---|
| Per-position cap | 25,000 USDC | setPerNftCap | PerNftCapUpdated |
| Keeper swap tolerance | 100 bps | setKeeperSwapSlippageBps | KeeperSwapSlippageUpdated |
| Fee recipient | Treasury Safe | setFeeRecipient | FeeRecipientUpdated |
| Hyperliquid operator allowlist | Seeded at deployment | setHlOperator | HlOperatorUpdated |
| Aggregator allowlist | 0x AllowanceHolder, 1inch v6 | addAggregator, removeAggregator | AggregatorAdded, AggregatorRemoved |
| Product registry | The two products above | registerProduct, setProductOpen | ProductRegistered, ProductOpenUpdated |
| Deposits paused | No | pauseDeposits, unpauseDeposits (pauser role) | DepositsPauseUpdated |
Frozen at deployment
| Setting | Why it cannot change |
|---|---|
| Pool allowlist | No setter. Every pool must pair its token with USDC and pass the cardinality check |
| Valuation pools | No setter |
| Deposit token set | No setter |
| USDC, WETH, position manager addresses | Immutable |
| Fee percentage | Compiled constant |
Changing any of these means deploying a new vault and migrating every position.
Related
- Roles and admin controls for who may call each setter.
- Performance fee for how the fee constant is applied.