Tuo docs

Audits

The status of every security review of the Tuo contracts, with report links added as they become available.

Tuo does not describe itself as audited. An internal audit-readiness review is complete. Cyfrin reviewed the Tuo contracts in September 2026, and the fixes for the findings Tuo accepted are in the code. The report will be published here when final. This page is the single place where that status is kept current.

The Cyfrin report is not published yet, so its findings and their fixes cannot be checked from outside Tuo. Do not treat the internal review below as an audit. Mainnet launch is blocked until every critical and high severity finding is closed.

Timeline

DateReviewScopeOutcomeReport
2026-09-08Internal audit-readiness reviewAll contracts under apps/contracts/src0 critical, 0 high. Static analysis with Slither: 0 real findings. A batch of ABI-neutral and storage-layout-neutral fixes shippedInternal
September 2026Independent external review by CyfrinSame scope plus the Uniswap V3, aggregator and Hyperliquid bridge integrationsReview held. The fixes for the findings Tuo accepted are in the codePublished here when final
After launchSecond independent reviewFull scopePlanned. Together with a bug bounty, this is the gate for lifting the per-position capPublished here when final

What the internal review covered

The internal review was run against the commit recorded in the auditor note that accompanies the contracts. It combined a manual pass over every source file, automated review agents, and static analysis. Its purpose was to make the external review efficient, not to replace it.

Facts a reader can reproduce from the repository:

ItemValue
Solidity0.8.26, pinned
ToolchainFoundry 1.5.1, via_ir, optimizer runs 200, EVM version cancun
DependenciesOpenZeppelin Contracts 5.6.1, Uniswap v3-core 1.0.2 (solc 0.8)
Test suite426 tests: 412 pass, 14 fork tests skip without an archive RPC
InvariantsI1 to I15, run by a hostile-keeper fuzz harness (1,000 runs x 128 depth under the CI profile)
TuoVault runtime size24,434 bytes, 142 bytes below the EIP-170 ceiling

The invariants are listed in plain language on Architecture.

Known deviations disclosed to reviewers

The contracts ship with a written note for auditors that lists every deliberate design decision Tuo would rather have challenged than rediscovered. The headline items are public and are covered in the Risks section:

  • Pricing is pool-native TWAP only. There is no Chainlink feed and no oracle registry.
  • The hedge leg leaves on-chain custody while a hedge is open.
  • The Hyperliquid operator set is a treasury-mutable allowlist. The one-operator-per-position rule is enforced by the vault: an operator binds to one position for life.
  • A final margin return is a keeper attestation with balance-sheet effect, bounded by an armed withdrawal request.
  • Aggregator retirement is a treasury lever over every swap, and through the keeper's idle swaps it also reaches the USDC settlement of a position still holding WETH or WBTC. The in-kind emergency exit is the one that needs no swap and cannot be reached.
  • A 100% withdraw is fail-closed on idle USDC. It settles only when every range is burned and every priced WETH or WBTC balance is converted completely, so one priced unit left idle stops it until the keeper sells that balance.
  • A 100% withdraw also waits for every range to be burned, including one worth zero at the average price, because nothing reaches a position after its NFT is burned. A WETH or WBTC balance too small to price is outside the settlement value, so the close pays it to the owner in kind, fee-free.
  • The keeper loss ceiling is sized on total basis, not on the on-chain allocation the charged actions can reach, so bridging margin raises it relative to what remains in the vault: 3% at Basis Plus Core's hedge cap, 15% at Delta Hedge Standalone's. On a heavily hedged position the swap floor and the action budget bind first, at about 9.6% at the launch swap tolerance of 100 bps, and that ordering depends on the tolerance the treasury sets, up to 250 bps. See Parameters.
  • emergencyWithdraw is MEV-exposed by construction. The protected path is requestWithdraw then withdraw.
  • After a sequencer halt, or any 30 minutes with no new pool observation, the spot-versus-average gate passes at any price, because the pool's 30-minute average then equals spot. The vault has no check for this. The keeper's software waits for the Arbitrum sequencer uptime feed plus an hour of grace, and for a pool observation newer than 30 minutes, before it mints a range or swaps idle funds. That wait does not bind a compromised keeper key. See Smart contract and oracle risk.
  • The emergency exit's performance fee is measured against the pool's 30-minute average price while the payout is the tokens themselves, worth what the market pays for them. After a fast fall the amount withheld exceeds 30% of what the exit realizes; after a rise it falls short, and an average that has not moved charges nothing on a profitable exit. Putting the deviation gate on that read was considered and rejected: the exit is owner-called, so a gate would let one displacement of the thinnest pool the position holds waive the fee outright. See Smart contract and oracle risk.

What lifts the cap

The guarded launch caps every position at 25,000 USDC. Lifting that cap requires two independent reviews and a live bug bounty. See Guarded launch.

Reporting a vulnerability

If you find a vulnerability, please use the process on Bug bounty and disclosure.

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